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ABSTRACT
Modern technologies and biomedicine ambitions have given rise to new models of
medical research, including population biobanking. One example of biobanking is brain
banking, which refers to the collection and storage of brain and spinal cord samples for
research into neurological diseases. Obviously, brain banking involves taking brains and
tissue from deceased people, a fact which complicates the role of recruiters and makes
consent a poor tool for stakeholders. After contextualising brain banking and consider-
ing the public health issues at stake, this article explores the legal definitions and
demands of, and actual processes around, consent in England/Wales/Northern Ireland
and authorisation in Scotland, articulating and evaluating their conceptual and practical
differences. It then argues for an expanded but improved operation of ‘authorisation’ in
the brain banking (and broader biobanking) setting, adopting ‘solidarity’ as our founda-
tion and the improvement of the ‘public good’ our objective.
KEYWORDS: Authorisation, Consent, Brain Banking, Posthumous Donation, Auton-
omy, Solidarity, Human Tissue
I . INTRODUCTION
Modern technologies and ambitions for biomedicine have given rise to new models of
medical research. One such model is population biobanking, which is the practice of
collecting tissue and data into a repository that can be used as a research tool by multi-
ple researchers over a period of time. However, despite widespread pursuit of, and
support for, biobanking, considerable uncertainty persists around how to most opti-
mally structure the governance of, and participation in, biobanks. Significant debate has
centred around how best to recruit participants, and whether consent could ever be
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‘informed’.1 Some have argued for a more ‘open’ or ‘broad’ consent, and some for
approaches that view consent as an ongoing process rather than a one-off event,2 and
others have argued for a retreat from consent (and consent language) altogether,3 claim-
ing that the more pertinent issues are those of ‘control’ and the advancement of the
‘public good’. For a variety of reasons, it is argued, the consent paradigm’s focus on the
position and wellbeing of the individual participant/donor and his or her autonomy sits
uncomfortably in the biobanking model, which is prospective, purposively indetermi-
nate, and aimed at furthering the interests of, and benefit to, the community as a whole.4
This lack of congruity is heightened in brain banking because one is there dealing
with ‘participants’ who are deceased at the time of their donation.5 The result is that
third parties are more often and more directly drawn into the recruitment interaction.
Participants are typically recruited in one of the following ways:
• an individual decides to donate, and records their wishes in an Advance Directive
or some other format, and their relatives are engaged and counselled after their
death;
• an individual is approached by a donor programme or their palliative care team,
and agrees to donate, making their wishes known, and their relatives are engaged
and counselled after their death;6
• an individual makes no decision about donation or at least fails to inform anyone
of his/her wishes surrounding donation, and an individual’s relatives may be
approached about donation after their death, in which case the relatives become
the primary decision-makers.
This recruitment process raises some important practical questions which are (or can
be) influenced by the recruitment model used:
1 See, eg, V Árnason, ‘Coding and Consent: Moral Challenges of the Database Project in Iceland’ (2004) 18
Bioethics 27–29; B Knoppers, ‘Biobanking: International Norms’ (2005) 33 J Law, Med & Ethics 7–14; G
Hengesson and others, ‘Ethical Framework for Previously Collected Bio Bank Samples’ (2007) 25 Nat
Biotechnol 973–6; J Forsberg and others, ‘Changing Defaults in Biobank Research Could Save Lives Too’
(2010) 25 Eur J Epidemol 65–8; J Allen and B McNamara, ‘Reconsidering the Value of Consent in
Biobank Research’ (2011) 25 Bioethics 155–66.
2 See, eg, T Caulfield and others, ‘Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome Research: Con-
sensus Statement’ (2008) 6 PLoS Biol e73; A McGuire and L Beskow, ‘Informed Consent in Genomics
and Genetics Research’ (2010) 11 Ann Rev Genom Human Genet 361–81.
3 S Harmon, ‘Semantic, Pedantic or Paradigm Shift? Recruitment, Retention and Property in Modern Popu-
lation Biobanking’ (2009) 16 Eur J Health Law 27–43. See also G Hengesson and others, n 1, above, and
T Caulfield and others, ‘Debate: DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy Option Involving an
Authorization Model’ (2003) 4 BMCMed E doi:10.1186/1472-6939-4-1.
4 S Harmon, Ibid. Similar arguments have been made in the context of organ donation for transplantation
purposes: see A Cronin and J Harris, ‘Authorisation, Altruism and Compulsion in the Organ Donation
Debate’ (2010) 36 J Med E 627–631.
5 Brain banking refers to the collection and storage of brain and spinal cord samples for research into neuro-
logical diseases: see J Bell and others, ‘Management of a Twenty-First Century Brain Bank: Experience in
the BrainNet Europe Consortium’ (2008) 115 Acta Neuropathol 497–507.
6 For more on these, see A Schmitt and others, ‘How a Neuropsychiatric Brain Bank Should Be Run: AConsen-
sus Paper of BrainNet Europe II’ (2007) 114 J Neural Transim 537–537. For examples of disease-specific
banks, see <http://www.ukmstissuebank.imperial.ac.uk/> and <http://www.parkinsonstissuebank.org.uk/>
accessed 27 March 2014.
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1. Who should consent in the absence of the expressed wishes of the deceased?
2. If the known wishes of the deceased conflict with those of the family, who
prevails?
3. If re-consent is needed for new research, who should provide this, especially
if the deceased gave the original consent?
This article follows from the AHRC-funded ‘Banking (On) The Brain’ (BOTB)
project.7 It examines the current framework for recruitment to brain banks in the UK.
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that post mortem examination (PME) rates are
declining, which translates into an inability to secure brains and brain tissue for research
(ie: hindered recruitment).8 Particular difficulties have been encountered in obtaining
unaffected or ‘normal’ brain tissue, which acts as a necessary control in the investigation
of disease9; without sufficient quantities of both ‘diseased’ and ‘normal’ tissue, there is a
real risk that research, which relies on numbers of statistical significance and control
data, will be stifled or might lead to incorrect conclusions and improper solutions.10
There are, of course, a variety of reasons for this decline, including historical ambiva-
lence towards autopsies,11 use of ownership models by families to claim possessory
rights in bodies,12 and the organ retention scandals of the late 1990s.13 To these we
would add the legislative frameworks under which recruitment now takes place.
7 Banking (On) The Brain, AHRC Exploratory Award No AH/J011495/1, February–September 2012,
funded under the AHRC’s Science and Culture Stream. The authors wish to acknowledge with apprecia-
tion the kind support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council, who funded ‘Banking (On) The
Brain’ through Exploratory Award No. AH/J011495/1.
8 See, eg, C Petri, ‘Decrease in the Frequency of Autopsies in Denmark After the Introduction of a New
Autopsy Act’ (1993) 5 Qual Assur Health Care 315–8; L Erikkson and C Sunstrom, ‘Decreasing Autopsy
Rate in Sweden Reflects Changing Attitudes Among Clinicians’ (1993) 5 Qual Assur Health Care 319–23;
J Lund and G Tierney, ‘Hospital Autopsy: Standardised Questionnaire Survey to Determine Junior
Doctors’ Perceptions (2001) 323 BMJ 21–22; C Hulette, ‘Brain Banking in the United States’ (2003) 62 J
Neuropathol Exp Neurol 715–722; G O’Grady, ‘Death of the Teaching Autopsy’ (2003) 327 BMJ 802–3;
NHS Implementation Sub-Group, Can Cross-Sectional Imaging as an Adjunct and/or Alternative to the Inva-
sive Autopsy be Implemented Within the NHS? (Crown, London 2012).
9 T Millar and others, ‘Tissue and Organ Donation for Research in Forensic Pathology: The MRC Sudden
Death Brain and Tissue Bank’ (2007) 213 J Pathol 369–75, at 374. Families of deceased patients affected
by a neurological disease are much more likely to authorise donation, or comply with the deceased’s desire
to donate.
10 Ibid, at 369.
11 See R Richardson, Death, Dissection and the Destitute (Phoenix Press, London 1988).
12 The unstable history of notions of property in relation to cadavers is exemplified by an evolution of cases:
eg, R v Stewart (1840) 12 Ad & El 773; R v Fox (1841) 2 QB 246; R v Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 959; R v
Feist (1858) Dears & B 590; Foster v Dodd (1867) 3 QB 67; Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659;
Dobson v North Tyneside HA (1996) 4 ALL ER 474; R v Kelly (1999) 2 WLR 384.
13 See, eg, K Mason and G Laurie, ‘Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the Shadow
of Bristol and Alder Hey’ (2001) 64 Mod LR 710–29; S Dewar and P Boddington, ‘Returning to the Alder
Hey Report and its Reporting: Addressing Confusions and Improving Inquiries’ (2004) 30 J Med E 463–
9. The Royal College of Pathologists Higher Specialist Training Committee, RCP Exam Guidelines—2012,
at <http://www.rcpath.org/Resources/RCPath/Migrated%20Resources/Documents/A/Exams_Autopsy_
July_2012.pdf> accessed 17 September 2013, indicates that, in the wake of the organ retention scandal,
physicians are hesitating to ask for autopsies, and, further, only 12% of junior doctors are informed when
an autopsy is to take place, only 6% attend autopsies, and many are declining to take higher specialist train-
ing in autopsies, resulting in a general decline in skills.
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In the following pages, after contextualising brain banking and justifying its character-
isation as supporting the public good, we consider ‘consent’ under the Human Tissue
Act 2004 (HTA 2004),14 and ‘authorisation’ under the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act
2006 (HTSA 2006). In doing so, we draw on secondary regulation from the Human
Tissue Authority (HTA),15 and have reference to recruitment strategies deployed by
brain bankers. After exploring the demands and consequences of consent in England/
Wales/Northern Ireland and authorisation in Scotland, we argue for a more uniform
shift from ‘consent’ to ‘authorisation’, with the caveat that we must ground ‘authorisa-
tion’ on a wider value base than currently prevails. We close by making a case for
improving the operation of authorisation in the biobanking and brain banking context
by operationalising ‘solidarity’, which would facilitate a shift in thinking about donation.
It would retreat from the contested concept of donation as an altruistic gift, advancing
the view that donation is rather a contribution to the wider social fabric (ie: to individual
health and the health of future generations) that is owed.
I I . PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC HARMS
In this section, we argue that health is an important and valued ‘public good’ and we
demonstrate that brain and neurological diseases are a serious and growing challenge
to health. We also point to the instrumental role that brain banks—by providing
well-curated samples of human tissue to a community of researchers—play in advanc-
ing knowledge about brain development and conditions that affect the brain, and
developing effective treatments for same. These realities are important for justifying
brain banking and the adoption of legal measures to support it.
A. Health as a ‘Public Good’
A ‘public good’ is an end, outcome, or commodity which is ‘non-rivalrous’,16 or ‘non-
excludable’,17 or both (ie: one person’s use or enjoyment of such goods will neither
negate nor diminish another person’s enjoyment).18 Applying these criteria in the
14 This applies to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, though note that on 2 July 2013, the Welsh govern-
ment adopted the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013, which implements a ‘soft opt-out’ system for
organ donation, whereby individuals will be presumed to have consented for their organs to be donated
unless they have opted out. Under this system, donation will not take place if a relative or longstanding
friend of the deceased objects on the basis of the deceased’s views so long as a reasonable person would
conclude that the relative or friend knows that the most recent prior-to-death view of the deceased on the
matter of consent for donation was that of opposition: see s 4(4)). This Act comes into effect in 2015, and
it is only applicable in relation to the donation of organs for transplantation, not organs donated for
research purposes.
15 As authorised by HTA 2004, s 26(1), the HTA has produced nine Codes of Practice which articulate standards
of conduct for persons carrying out activities within the remit of the HTA. The existing codes pertain to consent,
donation of solid organ for transplantation, post mortem examination, anatomical examination, disposal of
human tissue, donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral blood stem cells for transplantation, public
display, import and export of human bodies, body parts and tissue and research, and can be found at <http
://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice.cfm> accessed 17 September 2013.
16 Something is ‘non-rivalrous’ if one’s use of it does not diminish another’s use.
17 Something is ‘non-excludable’ if its use cannot be or should not be limited to certain people.
18 For more on public goods, see B Prainsack and A Buyx, Emerging Biotechnologies: Technology, Choice and
the Public Good (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London 2011) at 4.6. For a critique on the report, see A
Dawson and M Verweij, ‘Solidarity: A Moral Concept in Need of Clarification’ (2012) 5 Pub Health
Ethics 1–5.
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health context, we can say that one person’s health does not necessarily diminish
someone else’s health, and one’s achievement of health (or rather one’s possession of
health and vitality) does not in the normal course limit others’ achievement of it;
nobody in a population can be excluded from benefiting from a reduction in the risk
of infectious disease, for example, and one person benefiting from this reduction in
risk does not prevent anyone else from also benefiting.19 Of course, these claims
might be complicated when there is a need to access limited healthcare resources to
achieve that health, but, as will be argued below, this public/private divide is blurring
and becoming irrelevant to the characterisation of health as a public good.20
Some go so far as to argue that health is a global public good because enhanced
mobility, international trade linkages, information flows, and cross-border environ-
mental threats have accelerated the extra-national transmission of disease and of
behavioural and environmental health risks/determinants.21 While we concur with
this broader identification of public goods, it is not essential to our argument. Further
and relatedly, while we concede that the substance of what is meant by ‘in the public
good’ may evolve over time,22 and that some manifestations of it might not easily
co-exist,23 we take it as uncontroversial that health is also in the public good. In this
sense, we take ‘in the public good’ to mean an activity which will bring about some
real social welfare enhancing benefit to a community or society at large.
Individual and community health are the fount of all other social ambitions and
achievements; without health and some level of vitality, very little can be accomplished
(ie: no wealth-generation activities like labour, production or innovation, and no social
activities such as democratic engagement or cultural generation). Health is an impor-
tant—and arguably the most important—constituent element of individual and com-
munity existence, and all societies must engage with and promote health or they risk
failure. The fundamental importance of individual and community health is reflected by
the amount of critical thought, political attention, social and legal architecture, and public
money directed at their realisation. With respect to money note that the NHS typically
19 Paraphrased from R Smith, ‘Global Public Goods and Health’ (2003) 81 WHO Bull 475. Arguments have
also been made that surveillance of infectious diseases is a public good (W McNeill, Plagues and Peoples
(Anchor Books, NY 1976), and M Zacher, ‘Global Epidemiological Surveillance: International Coopera-
tion to Monitor Infectious Diseases’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg, and M Stern (eds) Ibid, 266–83, and that
actions aimed at controlling new environmental threats are public goods (A McMichael and A Haines,
‘Global Climate Change: The Potential Effects on Health’ (1997) 315 BMJ 805–9).
20 L Chen, T Evans, and R Cash, ‘Health as a Global Public Good’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg, and M Stern (eds)
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, Oxford 1999) 284–304.
21 L Chen, T Evans, and R Cash, Ibid, at 289. See also, R Smith, ‘Global Public Goods and Health’ (2003) 81
(7) WHO Bull 475. For more on public goods in the global context, see, D Dalrymple, ‘Scientific Knowl-
edge as a Global Public Good: Contributions to Innovation and the Economy’ in Steering Committee
(eds), The Role of Scientific and Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain (National Academies
Press, Washington DC 2003) 35–51.
22 For example, ‘public welfare’ was used as a justification to allow the compulsory sterilisation of the so-called
‘unfit’, which included those suffering from mental illness, in Buck v Bell (1927) 274 US 200.
23 G Laurie and others, ‘Managing Access to Biobanks: How Can We Reconcile Individual Privacy and
Public Interests in Genetic Research?’ (2010) 10 Med Law Int 315–337.
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represents one of the largest single national budget expenditures,24 and its 2011/12
budget was £106 billion (approximately 8.4 per cent of GDP).25
Of course, while most will agree that health is ‘in the public good’, rational agents
may well disagree about how to define health or health benefits. This may give rise to
difficulties in some contexts, but less so in the present one. If we accept that brain
disease, and particularly degenerative brain and neural conditions, are rising and are
affecting significant levels of the population, then it becomes much less contestable to
state that the pursuit of treatments for such conditions is in the public good. How to
decide on the type of research which should be pursued (ie: which conditions should
be prioritised outside those which affect significant numbers) is a separate issue, but is
nonetheless addressed briefly below.
B. Brain Diseases as a Pressing Public Harm
To state the obvious, health is diminished by injury and disease. Thus, we require social
systems (ie: policies, practices, institutions, instruments) for monitoring, maintaining,
and restoring health. In the UK, we have, inter alia, the NHS. Like most free-at-
point-of-service public health systems, the NHS began as an ambitious dream of univer-
sal care (and caring) which would serve to raise the relative welfare of society.26 While
ambitions for and expectations placed on the NHS have perhaps declined from their
lofty antecedents, it is still expected to deliver reasonable health to the public through
effective interventions delivered fairly and efficiently by competent professionals.
Of course, questions persist as to what this might mean in practice, particularly in
light of the following:
• increasingly expensive technologies and treatments (from new, narrowly
targeted and expensive drugs to IVF, etc.);
• increasingly aged populations (imposing the treatment pressures of
long-term and degenerative conditions); and
• decreasing numbers of system contributors (in the form of taxable employed
citizens).
Questions also persist about the implications of privatisation of some services
traditionally provided by the NHS, a main point of concern being the
consequences of such on standards of care,27 and sharpening of health
24 Public health spending in England, for example, has increased to £4.7 billion (including pharmaceuticals
but excluding secondary prevention): Department of Health, The NHS Belongs to the People: A Call to
Action (NHS England, London 2013) at 15.
25 Up from £437 million at its foundation in 1948: R Harker, NHS Funding and Expenditure (House of
Commons Library, London 2011).
26 See W Beveridge, ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services – 1942’ (2000) 78 WHO Bull 847–55.
27 See K Stacey, ‘NHS Privatisation with a Bill’, Financial Times, London, 17 April 2013, at <http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/3bdd3b3e-a77d-11e2-9fbe-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cLLIcmPs> accessed 17 September
2013; G Plummer, ‘“Arms” race over £5bn in NHS work’, Financial Times, London, 29 July 2013 at <http
://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6424b29e-f60a-11e2-a55d-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 17 September
2013; D Campbell, ‘NHS privatisation fears deepen over £1bn deal’, Guardian, London 26 July 2013, at
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jul/26/nhs-privatisation-fears-deepen-deal> accessed 17
September 2013.
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inequalities.28 Answers to these questions are not obvious, but also are not perti-
nent to the argument.
What is clear is that the NHS faces many difficult challenges as a result of changing
demographics, demands, and disease patterns. Neurodegenerative and other neuro-
logical diseases in particular are cited as pressing concerns. In 2011, in the
twenty-seven EU countries plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland (population: 514
million), disorders of the brain—defined as including mental and neurological ill-
nesses—were estimated as costing E798 billion per year.29 This represents twenty-
five per cent of the direct healthcare costs in Europe, with indirect costs adding to this
figure.30 A recent report estimated that the total cost of brain disorders in the UK in
2010 was E134 billion which included indirect costs, direct non-medical and direct
healthcare costs.31 In fact, the NHS is said to be facing a ‘neurological time bomb’ due
to expanding disease burdens and patient demand.32 The picture is similarly bleak at
a global level, as it has been estimated that disorders of the brain account for thirteen
per cent of the global disease prevalence, a level which surpasses both cardiovascular
diseases and cancer.33 And quite aside from the resource implications of these disor-
ders, the human impact is profound; they have life-altering health and functionality
implications for the patients, and cause social and relational fallout for families.
Ultimately, individual and community health are seriously threatened by diseases
of the brain, and will be increasingly threatened in the future, and this in turn will
place more and more pressure on already straining healthcare systems around the
world.34 As such, we can strongly claim that they are a pressing public harm which
should be met by the pursuit of rationally connected public actions to bolster the
public good that neurological and brain conditions diminish.
I I I . BRAIN BANKING AND INTERESTS IN CADAVERS
In this section, we argue that brain banking is such an action; it is in the public interest
(ie: it supports in a very direct way the public good that is health), and any effort to
regulate brain banking must be cognizant of the relative strengths of the interests at
stake.
28 See Secretary of State for Health, Government’s Response to the Health Committee Report on Health Inequali-
ties (HMG, London 2009).
29 A Gustavsson and others, ‘Cost of Disorders of the Brain in Europe 2010’ (2011) 21 Eur Neuropsycho-
pharmacol 718–79.
30 Ibid, at 765. A study conducted in 2003 claimed that disorders of the brain accounted for nearly 35% of
Europe’s entire disease burden: J Olsen and M Leonardi, ‘The Burden of Brain Disease in Europe’ (2003)
10 Eur J Neurol 471–7.
31 N Fineberg and others, ‘The Size, Burden and Cost of Brain Disease in the UK’ (2013) 27 J Psychopharm
761–770. The authors noted that this estimate of costs should be seen as conservative as some conditions
such as body dysmorphic disorder could not be included in the analysis due to limitations of data.
32 N Triggle, ‘NHS facing neurology disease time-bomb’, BBC News, London, 17 January 2012, at <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16581674> accessed 17 September 2013.
33 P Collins and others, ‘Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health’ (2011) 475 Nature 27–30. Indeed,
global burden of disease studies, which examine all disease groups, shows that higher proportions of global
disease burdens will be attributed to brain disorders: C Murray and A Lopez (eds), The Global Burden of
Disease (WHO, Harvard 1996).
34 See H Kretzschmar, ‘Brain Banking: Opportunities, Challenges and Meaning for the Future’ (2009) 10
Nat Rev Neurosci 70–8, at 71.
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A. Brain Banking in the ‘Public Interest’
The above harm snapshot justifies our claim that it is in the ‘public interest’ to actively
facilitate health research, and, more specifically, research into the workings of, and dis-
orders affecting, the brain. We define ‘public interest’ as the aggregate interest of a
populace and both the main objective and justification for democratically empowered
political structures.35 So acts ‘in the public interest’ are acts which are ‘in the public
good’ (ie: which have real welfare-enhancing potential for publics).
We recognise that defining ‘publics’ or ‘the public’ to which benefit should accrue in
a given context, and how many individuals an act needs to benefit for it to be deemed
in ‘the public interest’, may give rise to controversy; in fact the difficulty of drawing
boundaries on the ‘public’ in other contexts has been noted in detail elsewhere.36
Nonetheless, given that brain diseases are non-discriminatory of ‘publics’ in the sense
that they may affect any individual regardless of ethnicity, socio-economic background,
gender, age, etc., the ‘public’ which may be affected by illnesses of the brain will be sig-
nificant and will encompass the vast majority of the population. It follows that research
on the brain is firmly within the public interest in the broadest sense.
Of course, with advances in genomics and the predictability of illnesses, including
illnesses of the brain, the ‘public’ which may be affected by such diseases may be said
to decrease. Similarly, in the rare diseases context, one might argue that the public
affected is much smaller, making it questionable whether pursing treatments on such
diseases is in the broader public benefit. However, both these claims can be countered.
First, predictability is often not nearly as objective or accurate as the term suggests.
Many factors can diminish or negate the predictability claimed in relation to genetic
testing, including lifestyle and environmental factors, both of which might be imposed
on the individual. Second, from an impact perspective, rare diseases have consequences
for people well beyond the number of those afflicted. They place all manner of
burdens and hardships on families and loved ones, sometimes both well before and
well after onset of the disease in the patient. Thus, research on the brain does not just
benefit those who may suffer from illness, rather it has an important relational aspect.
All told, while the parameters of the ‘public’ can and have been contested elsewhere, it
is reasonable to say that, given the prevalence, potential for harm and relational aspect
of brain diseases, brain banking (and associated research) transcends the boundaries of
the obviously concerned ‘publics’ and touches on a significant portion of the ‘public’.
Ultimately, while we recognise that it can be difficult (or rather a matter of contes-
tation) to define what is truly in the ‘public interest’, or what it means to respect the
35 For more on public interest, see, eg, P Napoli and N Creskill, Foundations of Communications Policy: Princi-
ples and Process in the Regulation of Electronic Media (Hampton Press, NY 2001); L-S Ho, Public Policy and
Public Interest (Routledge, London 2011); A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest:
Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights’ (1999) 62(5) Mod LR 671–96.
36 See, J Reardon, ‘The Human Genome Diversity Project: A Case Study in Coproduction’ (2001) 31 Soc
Stud Sci 357–88; J Reardon, ‘Race Without Salvation: Beyond the Science/Society Divide in Genomic
Studies of Human Differences’ in B Koenig et al. (eds) Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age ( Rutgers U Press,
NJ 2008) 304–19; J Reardon, ‘Creating Participatory Subjects: Race, Science and Democracy in a
Genomic Age’ in S Frickel and K Moore (eds) The New Political Sociology of Science: Institutions, Networks,
and Power (U Wisconsin Press, Madison 2006) 351–77.
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‘public interest’,37 we take it as relatively uncontroversial that it is in the public interest
to actively promote and support public goods, and, as we have shown, health is a
public good. Further, brain banking is an integral part of (brain and neurological)
health research and thus it is in the public interest to maintain and support the dona-
tion of tissue to such banks.38 Obviously, this argument is premised on the assump-
tion that the banking undertaking and the research it facilitates is both ethically robust
and scientifically sound. On this point, it should be noted that the operation of all
tissue banks in the UK, including brain banks, is dependent on having the appropriate
ethics approval from a relevant Research Ethics Committee, as well as NHS Research
& Development approval.39 A licensing scheme also applies under the Human Tissue
Act 2004 to all tissue banks in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland,40 ensuring that
each bank meets appropriate ethical and safety standards. Scotland has also recently
adopted a non-statutory accreditation scheme for the collection and storage of human
tissue in NHS Scotland. Developed in consultation with NHS Scotland R&D Direc-
tors, NHS Scotland tissue bank managers, public partners, and Healthcare Improve-
ment Scotland, the scheme seeks to ensure tissue banks adopt the highest possible
professional standards.41 Additionally, all brain banks in the UK are part of the UK
Brain Bank Network, which seeks inter alia to put in place common ‘gold’ standards
for brain banking, including harmonised procedures for consent and stewardship
across the UK.42 Finally, researchers seeking to obtain tissue from MRC-funded brain
banks must also apply to the bank for permission. This usually results in an assess-
ment of the application based on its scientific merits, as well as the likelihood of it
giving rise to ethical issues.43 Ethically approved research using samples obtained
from ethically robust brain banks will generate knowledge that will:
37 M Häyry and T Takala, ‘American Principles, European Values and the Mezzanine Rules of Ethical
Genetic Databanking’ in M Häyry, R Chadwick, V Arnason, and G Arnason (eds) The Ethics and Gover-
nance of Human Genetic Databases (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 14–36.
38 One might go further and argue that health research and the knowledge it generates is a public good in
itself, but we need not go this far. For a discussion of knowledge as a public good, see J Stiglitz, ‘Theory of
Local Public Goods’ in M Feldstein and R Inman (eds) The Economics of Public Services (Halsted Press,
NY 1997). For arguments against scientific knowledge being a public good, see M Callon and G Bowker,
‘Is Science a Public Good?’ (1994) 19 Sci Tech & Human Values 365–424, and T Kealey, ‘The Myth of
Science as a Public Good’, Lecture to the Oxford Libertarian Society, Christ Church College, University of
Oxford, 22 May 2009. For a discussion of the public interest in the context of organ transplantation, see J
Harris, ‘Organ Procurement: Dead Interests, Living Needs, Cadaver Organs Should be Automatically
Available’ (2003) 29 J Med E 130–4.
39 Such approval can be applied for online through the Integrated Research Application System, available at
<https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/SignIn.aspx> accessed 27 March 2014.
40 See HTA 2004 ss16–25.
41 Chief Medical Officer, ‘Letter on the Accreditation Scheme for the Collection and Storage of NHS Tissue
in Scotland’ (2011), available at <http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/cmo/CMO(2011)07.pdf> at para 1,
accessed 27 March 2014.
42 For more see <http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Ourresearch/Resourceservices/UKBrainBanksnetwork/index.htm>
accessed 27 March 2014.
43 Ibid. Should the solidarity model proposed infra be adopted, further methods of ethical approval may be
considered in order to ensure research conducted from such samples is in pursuit of knowledge and/or
conditions of a pressing social/medical nature. Should there be financial or tissue shortages, mechanisms
prioritising certain pursuits/interventions may also need to be pursued. Methods of public engagement
might be investigated to extend to publics a more active role in such decisions. In any event, the precise
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• contribute to deeper understandings of the brain and human body;
• illuminate the causes and progression of diseases;
• contribute to more effective and less invasive cures, treatments, and/or
management strategies for the afflicted; and
• inform more cost-efficient and effective ways of structuring and delivering
healthcare system responses.
Further, the knowledge created will be probed and built-upon thereby expanding
human knowledge beyond that envisioned by the initial cost and contribution.44 The
long-term aggregate impact of brain banks will be to reduce human suffering and to
promote (and realise) better health and human functionality.45 In fact, biobanks (of
which brain banks are just one genre) have already been defended as valuable
resources for the public interest:
[W]e offer the following proposition: scientifically sound, ethically robust
research using biobanks is manifestly in the public interest. We would, in fact,
go further and suggest that there is a positive moral obligation to promote the
use of these research resources in ways that, in turn promote the public interest.
This can only happen through access. The imperative, then, is to promote
access on sound scientific, ethical, and legal principles.46
While brain banks have already been instrumental in furthering our understanding of
central nervous system function and neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkin-
son’s, and Multiple Sclerosis,47 and in recognising new types of diseases,48 their bene-
fits are not necessarily expected to be enjoyed by the individuals who participate/
donate. A long view of the research investment is evident, wherein the collective is pri-
oritised over the individual. In this way, brain banks serve as mechanisms of intergen-
erational justice (ie: the present generation contributes positively to the utility and
contours of such a framework require further investigation and are beyond the scope of this paper. It is
enough for our argument to highlight the already stringent mechanisms of ethical approval that are
required, and to note that these may and could be strengthened to align more closely with public objec-
tives, thereby giving the ‘public’ a more active role in the process as befits the solidarity model.
44 It is re-used and reconsidered, a process which further verifies knowledge and adds value to it: M Callon
and G Bowker, n 38, above, who, at 401, argue that scientific knowledge ‘ . . . is a durable good, not
destroyed or altered by its use. Even better, the more it is used the more its value increases because it
proves its fecundity, widens the scope of its applications, and becomes richer’.
45 For a discussion of the scientific knowledge being generated by such networks, see M Callon and G
Bowker, in n 38 above, and M Callon, ‘Four Models for the Dynamics of Science’ in S Jasanoff et al (eds)
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (SAGE, Newbury Park 1994) 29–63.
46 See G Laurie and others, n 23 above, at 322.
47 See, eg, H Kretzschmar, n 34 above; A Kutzelnigg and others, ‘Cortical Demyelination and Diffuse White
Matter Injury in Multiple Sclerosis’ (2005) 128 Brain 2705–12; S Roemer and others, ‘Pattern Specific
Loss of Aquapoporin-4 Immunoreactivity Distinguishes Neuromyelitis Optica from Multiple Sclerosis’
(2007) 130 Brain 1194–205; B Trapp and others, ‘Axonal Transection in the Lesions of Multiple Sclerosis’
(1998) 338 New Eng J Med 278–85; B Serami and others, ‘Dysregulated Epstein-Barr Virus Infection in
the Multiple Sclerosis Brain’ (2007) 204 J Exp Med 2899–912.
48 D Murphy and B Ravina, ‘Brain Banking for Neurodegenerative Diseases’ (2003) 9 Curr Opin Neurol
459–63.
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better health of future generations). In our view, this enhances the status of brain
banks as being in the public interest for it permits greater benefits to emerge for a
wider community over time.
We concede that the state’s obligation to foster brain banking depends on its ratio-
nal connection (or necessity) to the public good sought to be advanced (eg: health
for individuals and publics). In this respect, it is notable that while technological
advances allow improved disease progress monitoring in living brains, cell cultures,
and animal models,49 developments have not rendered the need for examination of
cadaveric brains obsolete.50 If anything, given its support of genetics and functional
genomics—which themselves have given rise to techniques which facilitate better
understandings of disease pathogenesis and potential therapeutic targets—PME and
removal of tissue for brain banks is more crucial than ever for investigating neurologi-
cal diseases and providing evidence of the efficacy of therapies.51 Thus, it is vital that
we have sufficient samples available in order to advance neurological understandings.
In summary, the public’s interest in brains is strong and the connection between pro-
curing them, generating relevant scientific and health knowledge, and improving
health is all rationally (indeed closely) connected.
The presence of commercialisation might be used to undermine the characterisa-
tion of brain banking as in the public interest. Private (commercial) entities do and
will continue to play an integral role in the realisation of improved health. The realities
of drug innovation are that it is time and cost-intensive beyond the capacity of purely
public support. This, combined with the large and potentially lucrative market for
neurological treatments means that commercial entities will be interested and
involved in brain and neurological research, and, to a lesser extent, in the formation
and maintenance of brain banks to support that research. However, commercial
involvement does not negate the public nature of the problem, the public interest in
brain banking (and research), nor the public good character of health.52
The primary consequence of commercial involvement is that some (or all) of the
eventual treatments may be subject to patent protection (or intellectual property
enclosure), thereby rendering them temporarily excludable, or selectively available
through licensing strategies or pricing regimes. This is, of course, not ideal; it means
that individuals will be asked/encouraged/required to donate for the public good in
the absence of an assurance that their donation will result in something instrumental
49 See J Bell and others, n 5 above, at 498, and H Kretzschmar, n 34 above, at 71.
50 J Bell and others, Ibid, at 498, and J Burton, ‘Clinical, Educational and Epidemiological Value of Autopsy’
(2007) 369 Lancet 1471–80. Cadaveric brains are obtained at post mortem examinations, at which the
brain is divided in two; one section is stored in formalin for neuropathologic diagnosis, while the other is
frozen and stored at −80°C in the brain bank to be distributed to requesting members of the scientific
community who have fulfilled relevant ethical and legal criteria: H Kretzschmar, n 34 above, at 71 and 75,
and S Harmon and G Haddow, ‘Banking (On) the Brain: The Neurological in Culture, Law and Science’
(2012) 12 Med Law Int 79–91, at 83.
51 J Bell and others, Ibid; H Kretzschmar, Ibid; T Miller and others, n 9 above; J Bell and others, ‘Neuropa-
thology of Human Alzheimer Disease after Immunization with Amyloid-beta Peptide: A Case Report’
(2003) 9 Nat Med 448–52. See also, eg, N Cairns and P Lantos, ‘Brain Tissue Banks in Psychiatric and
Neurological Research’ (1996) 49 J Clin Path 870–3; C Hulette, ‘Brain Banking in the United States’
(2003) 63 J Neuropathol Exp Neurol 715–22.
52 A point already made by L Chen, T Evans, and R Cash, n 20 above.
582 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
edlaw
/article-abstract/22/4/572/941225 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
that will be immediately available to everyone equally. However, two matters serve to
undermine this challenge. First, although the interplay of regimes is such that intellec-
tual property diminishes access, this diminishment must be viewed as temporary. The
fact is that the knowledge will eventually fall completely into the public domain, and
in the preceding period treatments will be available to patients, although their avail-
ability might be narrowed by costs to the bearers of healthcare funding (eg: taxpayers
and/or individuals). Second, given the gravity of the health problem society faces, it
behoves us to work within the confines of the legal order that has evolved in this
context, even if this means the sub-optimal availability of treatments (which we
readily admit, but which is not at all remedied by using the contested involvement of
the intellectual property regime to deny the existence of brain banking as being in the
public interest).
Given the ambiguous role of commercialisation, scientific knowledge is sometimes
described as an ‘impure’ public good, in the sense that if there is patent or other IP pro-
tection the knowledge becomes temporarily excludable (and therefore fails the non-
excludability criteria).53 Some have pointed to general public misgivings around com-
mercial involvement in and profit arising from such research, noting the common per-
ception of donation as a ‘gift’ and the concomitant assumption that it will not be
associated a financial return to another.54 To alleviate these misgivings, they have
advanced benefit-sharing models based on the Newfoundland and Labrador Model.55
This model requires a proposal for benefit sharing to be provided along with the appli-
cation for ethical approval. Obviously, a similar framework could inform brain bank
resource access, thereby ensuring not only that only approved research which was
deemed to be in the public interest is carried out, but also that measurable benefits are
returned to the community, even when private enterprises are accessing the resource.
In any event, our claim is simply that health research conducted using samples pro-
vided by brain banks has the potential to generate knowledge which will facilitate the
understanding of diseases and the development of treatments. This is undoubtedly of
benefit to individuals and to levels of community health and functionality.56 Hence, it
is in the public interest to promote the generation of such knowledge and brain banks
and associated research should therefore be actively encouraged, or at the very least
not unnecessarily impeded.
53 See J Stiglitz, ‘Knowledge as Global Public Good’ in I Kaul, I Grunberg, and M Stern (eds) Global Public
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, Oxford 1999) 308–25, at 310. Reforms aimed
at more open access to scientific knowledge arguably contribute to the ‘purity’ of scientific knowledge
(from a public interest perspective). For a discussion of the importance of open access models in the
biobank context, see A Marks and K Steinberg, ‘The Ethics of Access to Online Genetic Databases: Private
or Public’ (2002) 2 Am J Pharmacogenom 207–12.
54 Haddow and others, ‘Tackling Community Concerns about Commercialisation and Genetic Research: A
Modest Interdisciplinary Proposal’ (2007) 64 Soc Sci Med 272–282.
55 As proposed in D Pullman and A Latus, ‘Policy Implications of Commercial Human Genetic Research in
Newfoundland and Labrador: A Report for the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Health and
Community Services (St John’s: DOHCS, 2003).
56 Of course, one might question whether any public good is realised without some private and/or commercial
contribution and therefore interference. As such, the interplay of commercial interests here makes no diffe-
rence to the characterisation of health as a ‘public good’, or to brain banks as being in the ‘public interest’.
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B. Ranking the Stakeholders’ Interests
Before proceeding to a critique of how the law supports brain banking, it is important
to consider who has or may assert an interest in the material that is the ‘life-blood’ of
brain banks (ie: cadavers and their brains). We suggest that the (formerly) living indi-
vidual, the surviving family, and the public may all assert some interest, and the rela-
tive strength and foundation of that interest is considered below.
The first interest-holder is the deceased individual. While alive, that individual had
interests and rights enforceable against others, including the state and family
members, though none of these rights would have been absolute. Additionally, the
deceased can, while alive, express testamentary wishes in relation to a variety of
matters which will be enforceable after death through the estate using legal/state
mechanisms (eg: disposition of property, use of personal likeness, disposition of
body), although again there are limits as to what can be expected/demanded.57 In
complying with these wishes/instructions, we might claim that we are vindicating the
individual’s autonomy, but this is not entirely accurate. Presumably, an autonomous
decision was made while alive, but at the time of (posthumous) enforcement, it is not
autonomy that we are vindicating for the deceased ceases to ‘be’ and nothing can
physically or emotionally harm or improve his or her position. This has led to compel-
ling arguments that all of the deceased’s autonomy and interests (together with the
ability to personally enforce them) evaporate at death, and there are no obvious resid-
ual interests to defend.58 Bolstering this position is jurisprudence to the effect that
human rights cannot be claimed or enforced by or on behalf of someone who is not
living.59
One might argue that it is a dignity-based respect for the deceased that compels us
to comply with the deceased’s wishes (and to legislate compliance through instru-
ments like the HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006), but again the deceased remains indiffer-
ent to that dignity. He or she has none to claim or display. Ultimately, it might be
more the survivors’ remembrance of that (former) autonomy and dignity that is
being respected. It is a claim by the survivors to that intangible that connects the past
to the present and the future (the deceased to the living and the as-yet unrealised
descendants). While the maintenance of such connections has value, one might ques-
tion whether they seriously serve to strengthen a deceased’s interest in his or her
cadaver, which must be viewed as weak. It might serve to favourably place the survi-
vors’ interests in the cadaver, but more tangible and legally recognisable interests
might be desired for purposes of ranking claims.
57 In this regard, there is significant scholarship on the limits of the dead-hand: see, eg, T Kester, ‘Can the
Dead Hand Control the Dead Body? The Case for a Uniform Bodily Remains Law’ (2007) 29 W New
Eng Law Rev 571; L Friedman, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts and Inheritance Law (Stanford
U Press, Stanford 2009).
58 J Harris, ‘Law and the Regulation of Retained Organs: The Ethical Issues’ (2006) 22 LS 527–49, at 539.
For more on posthumous interests, see, eg, A Baier, ‘The Rights of Past and Future Persons’ in E Partridge
(ed) Responsibilities to Future Generations (Prometheus Books, NY 1980) 171–83; T Wilkinson, ‘Individual
and Family Consent to Organ and Tissue Donation: Is the Current Position Coherent?’ (2005) 31 J Med
E 587–90; D Sperling, Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives (CUP, Cambridge 2008).
59 See Vo v France, Case No 53924/00, 08 July 2004 (ECtHR), wherein the court refused standing for an
unborn foetus, stating that rights could only be held once the foetus was born alive.
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With respect to survivors, it is the deceased’s family who will, in the normal course,
have the best interest in the cadaver. Grieving relatives and loved ones will have a
strong emotional connection to the deceased, and thus, the current practice under-
standably seeks to put their interests centre-stage; this is a noble and compassionate
response. However, while we acknowledge that family members can have enforceable
(legal) interests in relation to the living individual (interests that are enforceable
against the state, against others, and against the individual him or herself ), those inter-
ests diminish upon the individual’s death, or rather the right to enforce those interests
diminish, often to the point of nullity (although we acknowledge that claims against
an estate can persist). With respect to the actual corpse, family members might invoke
ECHR Article 8 (right to private and family life) and/or Article 9 (right to freedom
of thought, consciences, or religion) to ensure its disposal in a certain way,60 but the
key point is that their legally recognised interest in the cadaver is restricted to posses-
sion for disposal (eg: burial or cremation).61 The operation of these provisions is
aimed at vindicating the deceased’s (and more often the survivors’) rights to have spir-
itual/religious and ceremonial expectations/conditions met (and so ties into the
dignity and memorial interests articulated above). However, even then it has been
held that the public interest might override their interests and/or stated position.62
Finally, there is the public’s interest in cadavers, which are grounded in state obliga-
tions to advance individual and public health, which, in turn, strengthen the social
fabric and viability of communities. The state’s interest in public health has long been
considered an important public interest, and a legitimate target for state action.63 The
disposition of cadavers as part of that action ensures that cadavers are properly/safely
disposed of so as not to pollute public spaces and essential utilities, and the state’s
allocation of cadavers for use serves to:
• contribute to medical training so our incoming physicians understand
anatomy and how to handle the body;64
• improve the evidence-base around cause of death and the efficacy of
treatments, thereby improving healthcare decision-making;65
60 For example, see Pannullo & Forte v France, Case No 37794/97, 30 January 2002 (ECtHR), and Girard v
France, Case No 22590/04, 30 September 2011 (ECtHR), wherein Art 8 was used by survivors of the
deceased to have a body returned for burial.
61 See J Harris, n 58 above, at 533.
62 In Regina v Greater Manchester North District Coroner, Ex parte Worch [1987] QB 627, wherein a practising
Jew was found dead after a car crash, the Coroner was held to be justified in conducting a PME despite this
being contrary to Jewish law because it was necessary to determine whether the deceased had died of
natural causes prior to the crash or had been killed in the crash.
63 Its interest in maintaining public health has long supported public authorities’ overriding power in relation
to the burial of human bodies: see s 46, Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, as amended.
64 See, eg, R Charlton, ‘Autopsy and Medical Education: A Review’ (1994) 87 H R Soc Med 232–6; J
Hooper and S Geller, ‘Relevance of the Autopsy as a Medical Tool: A Large Database of Physician Atti-
tudes’ (2007) 131 Arch Pathol & Lab Med 268–74.
65 See the remit and ambitions for the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), at <http://
www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whatwedo/what_we_do.jsp> accessed 17 September 2013. Studies show
that, in cases of multiple causes of death, a majority of death certificates are inaccurate in the absence of
PME, with many of the undiagnosed causes of death considered treatable: see M D’Amico and others, ‘Ill-
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• improve the evidence-base around clinical counselling and healthcare
decisions, thereby reducing the chance of clinical misunderstandings and/or
errors;66 and
• advance human knowledge, particularly life science knowledge and
understandings of drug pathways and mechanisms, thereby facilitating new
cures and treatments.67
Indeed, the value of PMEs has led some to argue that medical authorities should
reject the classification of PMEs as elective and adopt them as a professional obliga-
tion,68 although this might have unsustainable resource allocation consequences.
The state’s interest in health also engages some of its responsibilities under human
rights law, most particularly those implicated by the so-called right to health; the right
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and to a standard of
living adequate for health and basic needs is contained in numerous international
instruments.69 This right may be inferred from Article 2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (1950), which states:
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
defined and Multiple Causes on Death Certificates: A Study of Misclassification in Mortality Statistics’
(1999) 15 Eur J Epidemiol 141–8, and M Nashelsky and C Lawrence, ‘Accuracy of Cause of Death Deter-
mination Without Forensic Autopsy Examination’ (2003) 24 Am J Forensic Med Pathol 313–9.
66 Studies show that adequate PMEs combined with case discussion at hospital level can improve safety and
better inform practice choices: D Hoyert, Vital an Health Statistics: The Autopsy, Medicine, and Mortality
Statistics, Series 3 (DOH, Maryland 2001). A study of neonatal autopsies in south-east Scotland showed
that PMEs generated new information in 26% of cases, and in 3% of cases that new information proved
crucial for counselling: M Brodie and others, ‘Ten Years of Neonatal Autopsies in a Tertiary Referral
Centre: Retrospective Study’ (2002) 324 BMJ 761–3.
67 See, eg, L Calabrese and A Fleischer, ‘Thalidomide: Current and Potential Clinical Applications’ (2000)
108 Am J Med 487–95; M McDermott, ‘The Continuing Decline of Autopsies in Clinical Trials: Is there a
way Back?’ (2004) 89 Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed F198–9; B Cunha and others, ‘Renal Transplant
with Bronchiolitis Obliterans Organizing Pneumonia (BOOP) Attributable to Ttacrolimus and Herpes
Simplex Virus (HSV) Pneumonia’ (2012) 41 Heart Lung 310–5.
68 R Hill, R Anderson, and R Vance, ‘The Autopsy: A Professional Obligation Dissected’ (1990) 21 Hum
Pathol 127.
69 Instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), UN General Assembly Res. 217A
(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., UN Doc. A/810, 1948, Art 25; the WHO Constitution (1948), adopted at the
International Health Conference, New York, June–July 1946, Preamble; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 993 UNTS 3, Arts 9 and 12 and General Comment 3; the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), 660 UNTS
195; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), 1577 UNTS 44; the Declaration of Alma-Ata
(1978), at <http://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf> accessed 17 September 2013;
the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986), at <http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/
conferences/previous/ottawa/en/> accessed 17 September 2013; the Bangkok Charter for Health Promo-
tion in a Globalised World (2005), at <http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/6gchp/
hpr_050829_%20BCHP.pdf> accessed 17 September 2013.
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Importantly, the ‘right to health’ is increasingly seen as essential to achieving equi-
table societies. It has informed health policy reforms,70 and constitutional provisions
linked to the right to life, to dignity, and to physical integrity.71 In combination with
the legal and social entitlements that Europeans generally enjoy (and expect),72 the
effect of this right is that individuals have higher aspirations than ever before for
achieving and sustaining good health, including health in old age,73 and this will
surely continue in future generations.
To make this right effective, the state, through health authorities, must make suit-
able and timely treatment options available. To date, jurisprudence drawing on the
right to health has imposed on states and health authorities the obligation to:
• ensure that hospitals employ competent staff who are trained and work to a
professional level within systems that protect patients;74
• avoid putting an individual’s life at risk through the denial of care that they
would have made available to the larger population;75
• restructure national healthcare systems to improve care.76
Essentially, states and health authorities are expected to achieve more and to deliver
better health outcomes (usually with fewer resources), and this will be true with respect
to burdensome and widely experienced neurological diseases. The use of cadavers is a
vital component of fulfilling that expectation. Indeed, the importance of deceased dona-
tion was recently emphasised in the Human Transplantation of Organs (Wales) Act 2013,
which introduces a soft opt-out system for organ donation for transplantation in Wales.
Interestingly, s. 2 of the Act imposes a duty on Welsh Ministers to ‘promote transplanta-
tion as a means of improving the health of the people of Wales’. This marks a firm com-
mitment to improving the health of people through cadaveric donation. Similar
arguments could be made to justify promotion of donation for research; while such don-
ation does not have the immediate and personal effect as in transplantation, it has the
potential to generate knowledge which could improve the condition of generations (and
may reduce the demand for transplantation which now wildly exceeds supply).
Given the above, we argue that the public (ie: the collective as represented by the
state) has the greatest/strongest interest in cadavers and their disposition. The decea-
sed’s interests and those of the surviving family might be personal, sentimental, or
community-bonding, and they are largely dignity-based. By contrast, the public’s
interests are utilitarian, instrumental, and pressing. They are solidly grounded in
70 Uganda Ministry of Health, Review of the HSSPII in Relation to Human Rights and Gender as Part of the
Third-Term Review for the Health Sector, Second Draft (Ministry of Health, Kampala 2008).
71 H Hogerzeil and others, ‘Is Access to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfilment of the Right to Health
Enforceable Through the Courts?’ (2006) 368 Lancet 305–11.
72 Including strong mobility rights, increasing levels of education, widely available information about technologi-
cal capabilities and geographic inequalities, and rising desires for varied, self-actualising leisure opportunities.
73 E Rynning, ‘The Ageing Populations of Europe: Implications for Health Systems and Patients’ Rights’
(2008) 15 Eur J Health Law 297–306.
74 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation [2008] UKHL 74 (HL).
75 Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 30 (ECtHR).
76 Tutela Decision, T-760/2008, 31 July 2008, Colombian Constitutional Court.
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human rights responsibilities and expectations, but they are also community-bonding.
Realisation of those public interests will generate great advantage for a great number
of people, and will also enhance the dignity of those people (by giving them better
health, better lives, and better deaths).
IV. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BRAIN BANK
RECRUITMENT
The above demonstrates that, when crafting regulation governing the life sciences—
which are strongly linked to advances in healthcare and health—it is vital that we
think about:
1. the ‘public good’ and how we can better advance it;
2. what we expect of medical research and the scientific knowledge generated
therefrom;
3. whether we are willing to contribute sufficiently to the enterprise to fulfil the
great expectations we have placed in it.
As part of that exercise, it is axiomatic that the applicable legal framework be designed
to shape behaviour to facilitate the public good, not frustrate it, and to recognise and
accurately reflect the interests at stake. In terms of shaping behaviour, the legal frame-
work should facilitate donation by ensuring that an individual’s express wish to donate
is carried out and not overridden by third party interests. Individuals should be made
aware that in the event of uncertainty, there would be a presumption in favour of don-
ation. This would encourage individuals to think seriously about donation and facili-
tate wider (and maybe deeper) public thinking around medical research.
In other contexts, rewards are provided in order to encourage donation such as
providing cheaper healthcare for those who donate samples for research purposes.77
However, such schemes have been challenged on grounds that they may be exploit-
ative or derogatory of ‘true’ consent.78 While we do not necessarily agree with this
challenge, we do not recommend a rewards system for brain donation in part because
of the difficulties arising from the fact that the donor would be deceased at the time
of donation. An important aspect of our approach is the attitudinal shift that solidarity
could bring: individuals would come to better appreciate the individual obligations
that they bear and to recognise donation as a contribution to health, including their
own, all of which might result in stronger community sentiment towards donation. In
77 An example of this is the HFEA-accepted practice of ‘egg-sharing’ where a range of benefits may be offered
by fertility clinics to women undergoing infertility treatment if they donate ova to other couples or for
research purposes. This generally involves a reduced fee for fertility treatment. For more see <http://www.
hfea.gov.uk/1411.html> accessed 27 March 2014. See also, A McNab, ‘HFEA Statement on Donating Eggs
for Research’ (2007), available at <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/471.html> accessed 27 March 2014. Though
payment for donation is prohibited, donors can receive £750 per cycle of donation to cover expenses and loss
of earnings, see <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/donating-for-research.html> accessed 27 March 2014.
78 For a discussion of these arguments and the experiences of donors in the context of egg-sharing, see E
Haimes, K Taylor, and I Turkmendag, ‘Eggs ethics and Exploitation? Investigating Women’s Experiences
of an Egg Sharing Scheme’ (2012) 34 Soc Health & Illness 1199–214.
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short, for the public good to be truly acknowledged in biolaw, the legal framework
must be designed to (strongly) encourage individual contribution.79
Given all of the above, two questions are implicated: (1) How has the law been
fashioned? (2) How is it working to support brain banking? In this section, we
explore those questions, focusing on the regulatory frameworks in England/Wales/
Northern Ireland and Scotland, respectively. After articulating the conceptual founda-
tion of the legal regimes, we examine the consent and authorisation models more
closely, highlighting intended differences, and then the problematic role of families in
brain bank recruitment, which tends to negate those differences.
A. Conceptual Foundations of the Legislative Frameworks
The existing framework for the donation of human tissue, including brain tissue,
emerged as a result of public concern (and outrage) over non-consensual post
mortem removal and retention of organs in both England and Scotland.80 Investiga-
tions undertaken at the time found that the brain was the organ most often retained,
although most brains were retained for diagnostic rather than research purposes.81
They were retained as a result of genuine beliefs that retention was in the ‘public inter-
est’, and erroneous beliefs that the Coroner or Procurator Fiscal could authorise reten-
tion of organs which had no bearing on the cause of death.82 Interestingly, the
primary cause of distress was the lack of information and consultation rather than the
retention itself.83 In any event, the public outcry resulted in a heavy emphasis by poli-
cymakers and legislative reformers on ensuring disclosure and clearer decisional
frameworks for post mortem retention of tissue. The resultant legislative frameworks
were heavily shaped by ‘autonomy’ and ‘risk’, concepts that place the individual at the
centre of all things and emphasise the need to ‘protect’ people ‘from’ the medical
establishment and the harms that might follow from research participation.
Autonomy acknowledges the human capacity (and desire) for self-determination
and self-rule. It values people as physical, psychological, economical, and legal entities
individuated from others, and respect for autonomy involves creating spaces for indi-
viduals to make decisions relating to themselves with as little interference (or coercion
79 Recall that the public’s compelling interests in cadavers are currently being met with declining PME rates
with the result that brain banks struggle with recruitment.
80 For the Scottish investigations, see Audit Scotland, Organ Retention Validation Review: Performance Audit
(Audit Scotland, Edinburgh 2002). For the English investigations, see Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry,
Interim Report: Removal and Retention of Human Material. (Crown, London 2000); Royal Liverpool Child-
ren’s Inquiry, The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry: Summary and Recommendations (Crown, London
2001); Chief Medical Officer, The Removal, Retention and Use of Human Organs and Tissue from Post
Mortem Examination (DOH, London 2001); Chief Medical Officer, Report of a Census of Organs and
Tissues Retained by Pathology Services in England (DOH, London 2001); and Health Services Directorate,
Report at Post-mortem Examination and Disposal of Human Materials in the Chief Medical Officer’s Census of
NHS Pathology Services (DOH, London 2000).
81 See Department of Health, The Investigation of Events that Followed the Death of Cyril Mark Isaacs, (Crown,
London 2003). (Isaacs Report) In Chief Medical Officer, Ibid, it was reported that brains accounted for
44% of all retained organs from 1970–1999.
82 See Isaacs Report, Ibid, at 7 and 175.
83 T Millar and others, n 9 above, at 374.
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or duress) as possible.84 It therefore serves as a foundation for rights relating to physi-
cal integrity, freedom from coercion, and privacy.85 Risk is the potential or probability
of some event or occurrence happening that is negative or harmful to individuals and
communities (eg: something that destroys, damages, injures, unbalances, challenges,
questions, or affronts).86 Risk discourses have increased in society as people, driven
by autonomy, wish to control more and more of the lived environment and their des-
tinies within it. As this has happened, the regulatory concern with risk has also
climbed, with much regulation aimed at minimising deviations from the (agreed)
norm.87
Given the above, the doctrines of consent and, latterly, authorisation have
emerged. In the medical context, consent grew from a desire to protect individuals
against harm or unwanted invasions of bodily integrity.88 In the research context, it
developed with the goal of ensuring respect for individuals and avoiding a repetition
of the medico-scientific atrocities committed during World War II.89 It has evolved as
a means to facilitate the exercise of individual autonomy with respect to actions relat-
ing to one’s body (offering individuals some control over the risks to which they
expose themselves), and authorisation has inarguably taken up that same cause. In
both cases, a key ambition is to inform individuals and allow them to make decisions
relevant to risks, and their inclusion in regulation typically contains mandated assess-
ments of risk or harm manifestation. It must also be acknowledged that consent has a
double effect in that obtaining it serves not only to protect patients but also to protect
medical practitioners such as doctors, researchers, etc. from unwanted litigation.90 In
the HTA 2004 and the HTSA 2006, the doctrines of consent and authorisation
respectively replaced the ‘lack of objection’ criteria contained in the Human Tissue Act
1961.91
84 See, eg, T Beauchamp and R Faden, The History and Theory of Informed Consent (OUP, Oxford 1986), G
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (CUP, Cambridge 1988); T Beauchamp and J Childress,
Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4th edn OUP, Oxford 1994).
85 O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP, Cambridge 2002) at 23.
86 See, eg, P Slovic, The Perception of Risk (Earthscan, London 2001); D Lupton, Risk (Routledge, London
1999).
87 See, eg, B Massumi, ‘Everywhere You Want to Be: Introduction to Fear’ in B Massumi (ed) The Politics of
Everyday Fear (U Minn Press, Minneapolis 1993) 3–38, D Lupton,Medicine as Culture: Illness, Disease and
Bodies in Western Societies (SAGE, London 2003).
88 See J Harris, n 58 above, at 531–2; M Sutrop, ‘Viewpoint: How to Avoid a Dichotomy Between Autonomy
and Beneficence: From Liberalism to Communitarianism and Beyond’ (2011) 269 J Internal Med 375–9,
at 376.
89 T Caulfield and others, n 2 above.
90 This follows on from the Bolam principle whereby ‘a doctor is not negligent if he acts in accordance with a
practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion’: Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. This, in turn, means that if consent which is deemed to be in
accordance with the current practice by a reasonable body is obtained, then the doctor will not be liable in
negligence. In the Scottish context, see Hunter v Hanley 1955 SLT 213.
91 See Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, Death and the Procurator Fiscal: Information and Guidance
for Medical Practitioners (2008), para 16.1, at <http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Publications/
Resource/Doc/13546/0000506.pdf> accessed 6 March 2013. Parenthetically, neither the HTA 2004 nor
the HTSA 2006 specifically refers to brains or brain tissue, or indeed to any specific type of organ or tissue.
What is significant is the origin of the tissue (from humans) and the status of the donor at the moment of
donation; brain tissue is considered to be tissue from a deceased person.
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B. Decisional Mechanisms Under Both Acts
The HTA 2004 relies on a traditional consent model in that, after provision of relevant
information addressing risks and benefits of the particular intervention (here donation),
the ‘appropriate consent’ must be given. The ‘appropriateness’ is determined having ref-
erence to whether the statutorily required person has given the consent, and this
depends on whether the subject (or donor) is an adult, an adult without capacity, or a
child. For example, under section 3(6), the appropriate consent of an adult is mani-
fested as his or her decision in force immediately before death. If no such decision was
made (or is known), then the appropriate consent is the decision of his or her ‘nomi-
nated person’ under section 4. If he or she has not nominated a decision-maker, then
the appropriate consent is that of the person who stands in the most authoritative ‘quali-
fying relationship’ to him or her immediately prior to death. The ranking of qualifying
persons is set out in section 27(4) as follows: spouse or partner; parent or child;
brother or sister; grandparent or grandchild; child of a person the person concerned
brother or sister; stepfather or stepmother; half-brother or half-sister; friend of long-
standing. The Act offers nothing by way of criteria for shaping individual choices.
As with consent, ‘authorisation’ under the HTSA 2006 is a decisional model
driven by autonomy, risk, and the individual, and authorisation must be given by the
‘appropriate person’. This varies depending on whether the donor is an adult, a child
12 years or over, or a child under 12 years of age.92 Like the consent model, authorisa-
tion draws heavily on risk.93 The term ‘authorisation’, however, was preferred over
that of consent because it was felt to better capture the actual interests and circum-
stances at play. The influential McLean Report94 defended its preference as follows:
• Authorisation would reinforce the belief (in everyone concerned) that
individuals could and should make decisions about their own bodies, and
that these decisions should be enforced.95
• While ‘authorisation’ better captures the right of donors (or relatives) to
receive full information, it preserves their right to decline certain details while
still being able to make an enforceable/lawful decision; authorisation better
balances the need for decision-makers to receive sufficient information to
make a judgment and for staff to be more sensitive around the provision of
information.96
• The common law requirement that parental decisions relating to children be
in the child’s ‘best interests’ put parents in an untenable position with respect
to tissue/organ donation because ‘best interests’ would be difficult to
demonstrate. Authorisation better describes the obligations and powers
92 For guidance on the appropriate person, see HTSA 2006, ss 6–10.
93 Although, as noted elsewhere, the individual risks associated with participating in biobanks are minimal,
and are not at all commensurate with participation in more tradition trial-based research: see B Prainsack
and A Buyx, ‘A Solidarity-Based Approach to the Governance of Research Biobanks’ (2013) 21 Med LR
71–91. This might be viewed as doubly true where the participation occurs after death.
94 Independent Review Group, Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem: Final Report (Department of Health,
Edinburgh 2001). (McLean Report).
95 Ibid, at 41.
96 Ibid, at 41.
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which come with parenthood insofar as it signals their rights against third
parties who might try to interfere with family relationships.97
In short, ‘authorisation’ was erected as an autonomy-based approach which has the
primary goal of ensuring that the wishes of the deceased are enforced, but which has
the ancillary aim of reducing the amount of information which decision-makers need
in order to make an enforceable decision, whether that decision-maker is the deceased
who may give authorisation prior to death, or surviving family members thereafter. So
conceived, ‘authorisation’ is more suitable than ‘consent’ in the brain banking context,
which implicates deceased individuals, for at least four reasons.
First, a key ambition of consent, in addition to those noted above, is to protect the
physical integrity interests of the living.98 However, this ambition has little relevance
in the cadaveric context. The reality is that the human corpse does not remain intact
but rather naturally decomposes.99 Thus, there can be no legitimate interest in physi-
cal integrity after death. Moreover, because bodies must be buried or cremated, there
can also be no expectation of inviolability. As such, one of the primary interests
intended to be protected by consent is not directly engaged in deceased donation,100
and therefore, it may not be the most appropriate legal mechanism.
Second, as articulated in the McLean Report, authorisation is intended to empha-
sise that the decision to donate does and should originate from the person’s own voli-
tion. It is intended to signal a firmer commitment to respecting the expression that
the individual made when alive. Indeed, it has been emphasised that authorisation is
intended to more clearly convey the idea that people have the right to express during
their lifetime their wishes about what should happen to their bodies after death, and
that they should be able to expect that those wishes will be respected.101 This suggests
a more active role for the donor and a greater commitment to self-determination.102
Third, it serves to ease the informational burden on all parties. This is appropriate
in two respects. First, decisions need to be taken very soon after a person’s death; the
brain deteriorates quickly so donation must be carried out within the first few days.103
Authorisation acknowledges that the donor and/or relatives may not want to receive
detailed information about the donation procedure, and it gives recruiters discretion
97 Ibid, at 29–31.
98 See, eg, K Mason and G Laurie, n 13 above, at 717, J Harris, n 58 above, at 531, O O’Neil, ‘Some Limits
on Informed Consent’ (2003) 29 J Med E 4–7; J Wilson, ‘Is Respect for Autonomy Defensible?’(2007) 33
J Med E 353–6; A McGuire and others, ‘DNA Data Sharing: Research Participants’ Perspectives’ (2008)
10 Genetics Med 46–53; and J Mason and G Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics
(8th edn OUP, Oxford 2011).
99 J Harris, n 58 above, at 547.
100 See E Patridge, ‘Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect’ (1981) 91 Ethics 243–64; W Waluchow,
‘Feinberg’s Theory of “Preposthumous” Harm’ (1986) 25 Dialogue 727–34.
101 Scottish Executive Health Department, Human Tissue Act 2006: A Guide to its Implementation for NHS
Scotland (SE, Edinburgh 2006) para 8.
102 Currently, such expressions are often undermined by third parties, prompting the question of whether we
should ever let others make determinations over another’s body. In the event that we do, and clearly the
HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006 provide that we do, the question of to whom that power falls is one that we
may not have answered correctly. For more on deceased donation, see K Mason and G Laurie, n 13 above.
103 The interval between death and post-mortem varies depending on legal and resource constraints. In the
MRC Sudden Death Brain and Tissue Bank, the interval was measured at between 28 and 140 h with a
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about the amount and specificity of information which they provide to donors/rela-
tives should these parties agree to this, though of course recruiters must still give suffi-
cient information to allow a decision to be made. Second, it acknowledges that some
information around the purposes of tissue use (and thus possible longer term risks)
cannot be known at the time of recruitment or donation (ie: it better caters for situa-
tions where research uses may not be fully known and where research may develop in
a different manner than originally conceived).104 In both cases, it signals that dona-
tion is still permitted provided the authorising person has sufficient information to
make a decision.
Fourth, and following on from the third reason, authorisation diminishes the need
for re-contact, or reduces the circumstances under which re-contact and new authori-
sations will be necessary, which, in the brain banking case, would necessarily implicate
third parties. Indeed, the Organ Donation Taskforce has opined that consent require-
ments are not fulfilled where relatives have to make the decision and are unclear as to
what the donor would have wished.105 The Taskforce claimed that the process is
more appropriately viewed as an act of ‘authorisation’,106 again reinforcing the distinc-
tion between the two concepts. To alleviate the third party involvement complication,
one might draft consent forms very broadly so as to cover many potential uses, but
this challenges the ‘informedness’ on which consent is founded.
The consequence of the above is that there are important conceptual differences
between consent and authorisation. While both advance the ethical interests of deci-
sional integrity, they do not demand uniform or common practices; they might be
viewed as ethically ‘equivalent’ rather than ‘equal’, and so might be held up as an
example of ‘harmonised’ rather than ‘standardised’ approaches to conduct (ie: as non-
standardised practices that are equally acceptable and effective).107 Unfortunately for
recruiters in Scotland, the HTA and Scottish authorities (and perhaps patients) seem
to view consent and authorisation as convergent and standardised, and so performed
in largely the same manner with the same steps and tools. While the regulator’s aim is
to ensure ‘continuation of the arrangements for sharing organs and tissue across the
UK’,108 the result is that authorisation does not do the work it might otherwise
accomplish; like consent, it leaves significant scope for family interference in donation
decisions, thereby prioritising family affecting interests over those of the donor and
the public.
mean of 70 h: T Millar and others, n 9 above, at 372. For a discussion on the effect of post mortem delay
on tissue, see I Ferrer and others, ‘Brain Banks: Benefits, Limitations and Cautions Concerning the Use of
Post-Mortem Brain Tissue for Molecular Studies’ (2008) 9 Cell Tissue Banking 181–94.
104 T Caulfield, R Upshur, and A Daar, ‘DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy Model Involving
an Authorization Model’ (2003) 4 BMC Med E 1–4.
105 Organ Donation Taskforce, The Potential Impact of an Opt Out System for Organ Donation in the UK
(Crown Printer, London 2008) at 1.12.
106 Ibid, at 7.5.
107 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice 1: Consent (HTA, London 2009) para 16.
108 Organ Donation Taskforce, n 105 above, and see also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Bodies: Dona-
tion for Medicine and Research (NCB, London 2011) para 2.15.
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C. Divergence between Rules and Practice
The lapse of time between the deceased’s expression of giving and the act of donation,
combined with the absence of the donor at the actual time of the donation, results in
a peculiar operation of consent/authorisation whereby the donor can become, and
often is, marginalised. Unless an Advanced Directive is operable or the express wishes
of the deceased are otherwise known to the physician(s) involved in the donor’s palli-
ative care or post-palliative handling, brain bank recruiters will have to solicit and
comply with the wishes of a third party, which usually means a family member or
members. The difficulty of their job is compounded by the fact that decisions need to
be taken very soon after a person’s death. These can be emotionally charged days, and
the family may not be equipped to deal with decisions in relation to donation and dis-
section.
The statutes clearly identify the order of those who have decisional priority,
placing the deceased at the top.109 However, even in cases where a deceased person
has expressed a clear wish to donate his or her brain or other tissue, those wishes will
not be carried out by physicians/researchers in the face of objections by family
members.110 In short, despite an absence of any statutory veto, family members
(sometimes regardless of where they rank in the decisional hierarchy) may still, and
do, veto deceased donation decisions properly made and recorded,111 a scenario
which has been described as a ‘double veto’.112 This of course does nothing to respect
the decision of the deceased who, while alive, made a reasoned and morally conscious
decision about their death and the disposition of their body (and its parts); presum-
ably, they wanted to contribute in some way to society through research in keeping
with their duties under the social contract model. It also fails to recognise and enforce
the statutory hierarchy of authority in situations where there are conflicting positions
among the survivors.
While this deferential seems unjustified under both consent and authorisation
models, it is particularly contrary to the latter, which is intended to signal a stronger
commitment to carry out a deceased donor’s wishes. The McLean Report was
adamant that those wishes should be paramount, stating that they should be respected
‘unless there is reason to believe that the deceased had a change of mind before
109 See s 27(4) HTA 2004 and s 50 HTSA 2006.
110 Even in the case of publicly authorised PMEs, a family member must consent to tissue retention for
research purposes. There are three types of post mortem examinations: (1) Coroner / Procurator Fiscal
Autopsies: performed at the instigation and under the authority of the coroner (England/Wales) or procu-
rator fiscal (Scotland) where cause of death is not known and so no death certificate can be issued; (2)
Hospital Autopsies: performed when the cause of death is known and a death certificate can be issued, but
specific clinical questions relating to diagnosis or treatment modalities are implicated; (3) Family Autop-
sies: performed at the request of the family. While no family consent (or knowledge) is required to under-
take a Coroner’s or Procurator Fiscal’s autopsy, the public authority is functus officio thereafter so consent is
required before the pathologist can retain tissue for research. Family consent is also required under the
other types of autopsies, which also require consent for the conduct of the autopsies themselves. If families
demand return of the body and its associated tissue, they have a right to possession for the limited purpose
of burial or cremation.
111 BOTB Project, Roundtable Workshops, 4 April 2012 and 19 September 2012.
112 The individual donor gets a veto (eg a right to refuse donation despite the family desiring them to do so),
and family members get a veto (eg a right to effectively block donation despite an express wish to donate
by the deceased): see T Wilkinson, n 58 above, at 587.
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death’.113 Indeed, the McLean Report was specifically critical of the old practice of
giving priority to family wishes:
Very often interpretation of the law has gone beyond its strict requirements.
Doctors will virtually always ask relatives actively to agree to the use of the dead
body, rather than, simply asking about the wishes of the deceased. While this
practice is understandable given the circumstances, it fails spectacularly to respect
the competently expressed wishes of the person now deceased.114 [emphasis added]
It recommended that:
the expressed wishes of the individual adult, competently made before death,
should take priority over the wishes of surviving relatives. The current legal
requirement to discover whether or not this agreement has been withdrawn
should remain, but it must be clear that the relatives have no legal role in cir-
cumstances where the deceased had made known, and not retracted, his or her
wishes . . . . An important concomitant of this recommendation to be a cam-
paign directed at those who may wish to make such a declaration to encourage
them to discuss their wishes freely and fully with those who will ultimately be
asked about the deceased’s intentions . . .115
Despite the above, this deferential approach has both some commendable practical
consequences and some regulatory support. With respect to the former, it is a prag-
matic and sensitive approach to dealing with bereaved families. Medical practitioners
have no wish to compound the emotional difficulties of mourning families, and they
have strong self-interest in not embroiling themselves in unseemly disputes over the
use of a deceased family member’s body, particularly with the retained body parts
scandal so recently in the past. Thus, as a simple matter of relational harmony and
reputational preservation, and indeed as an act of solidarity with the bereaved family,
this approach makes sense on the ground. In the context of organ donation for trans-
plantation, the Scottish government has stated:
Few, if any, transplant surgeons would go against the wishes of a family. Whilst
there are unlikely to be any repercussions against a surgeon who removed
organs in the face of family objections from a person who wished to be a donor,
there are few surgeons who would add to the stress of a grieving family by
acting contrary to their wishes. Negative publicity from such an act would also
have a detrimental effect on organ donation.116
113 See Scottish Executive Health Department, n 101 above, at 39.
114 Ibid, at 39–40.
115 Ibid, at 40.
116 Scottish Government, Organ Donation: Transplant Pack (2003), at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/2003/11/18095/25897> accessed 17 September 2013. See also <http://www.
organdonationscotland.org/faqs-and-common-myths> accessed 17 September 2013.
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Additionally, this approach permits an operational flexibility, allowing the physician
(or recruiter) to exercise personal and professional judgment about how to proceed
in each case. In short, sensitivity and respect are cornerstones of the interaction; not
respect for the deceased but for those who remain. Such respect should be a funda-
mental element of the physician’s (and recruiter’s) professional duties, and a forma-
tive part of the professional team’s interactions with patients and families. It reflects a
valuable civility that has been encouraged by the post-paternalistic turn in medical
culture; whereas practitioners once decided with little or no consultation what was in
the interest of the patient, patients now are expected to be more actively involved in
treatment decisions through conversations about their care/treatment.
With respect to regulatory support, the deferential approach is acknowledged by
the HTA’s Code of Practice I: Consent. Applicable to both the English/Welsh/North-
ern Irish and Scottish frameworks, it states that if a deceased person or nominated
representative has consented to donation but those close to the deceased object, a
healthcare professional should discuss the matter sensitively with the parties, should
encourage the objector(s) to accept the wishes of the deceased, and should be
informed that they have no right to veto these wishes.117 It goes on to state, that in
such circumstances a practitioner should consider ‘the impact of going ahead with a
procedure in light of strong opposition of the family, despite the legal basis for doing
so’.118 This inconsistency (between statute and practice guidance) is also evident in
the Code’s guidance relating to child donation in cases where the wishes of the parents
or guardians conflict. It states that it is sufficient for one person in a position of paren-
tal responsibility to give consent to donation of a deceased child’s tissue/organs, but
then advises that:
The issue should be discussed fully with relatives and careful thought should be
given as to whether to proceed if a disagreement arises between parents or
family members. Any previously stated wishes of the deceased child should be
considered, taking into account their age and understanding.119
The real-world consequence is that, regardless of whether HTA 2004 ‘consent’ or
HTSA 2006 ‘authorisation’ is relied on, neither legal mechanism is strictly enforced in
the face of objections by family members, or conflicts within the family.120
V. SOLIDARITY AND AN EMPHASIS ON THE ‘PUBLIC ’
IN BRAIN BANKING
Although both the HTA 2004 and HTSA 2006 are grounded on autonomy and risk,
and on the decisional authority of the individual, with authorisation intended to be
even more autonomy-confirming than consent, practices on the ground have served
to erode the differences between consent and authorisation, and to weaken the
117 See Human Tissue Authority, n 107 above, at para 76.
118 Ibid, at para 76. For more on consent and deceased donors, see Royal College of Pathologists, Guidelines
for the Retention of Tissues and Organs at Post-Mortem Examination (RCP, London 2000).
119 See Human Tissue Authority, n 107 above, at para 95.
120 See BOTB, n 111 above.
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operation of both mechanisms insofar as recruiters are challenged by survivor opposi-
tion in the face of deceased consent/authorisation. While this might be seen to con-
tribute to a more cooperative decision-making process around the use of bodies, it
has had the real-world effect of blocking donation in the face of any objections by sur-
vivors. Ironically, the autonomy interest that frames the whole regime gets frustrated
and the regulation fails to deliver on its promise to the deceased and the scientific
undertaking. We suggest an approach more sensitive to the obvious and important
‘public interest’ aspects of brain banking, which are currently under-emphasised in the
legislation and under-operationalised in practice.121
A. AValue Foundation to Support the Public Interest
To make a real impact, the public interest must be given a role more in keeping with
its significance (ie: given the increasingly high statistics and incidence of brain disease,
it is imperative that research in this area is actively supported and that the public bene-
fits are both emphasised and realised). There is thus a need to recognise the ‘public’
as an important stake-holder in the donation framework. This can only be achieved if
the value-base underpinning the human tissue use regime is broadened.122 In particu-
lar, ‘solidarity’ should be deployed as an action- and decision-guiding value in relation
to the dead body; indeed, it should be given a prominence that is at least equivalent
to other guiding values, including autonomy.123 Solidarity has been defined as encom-
passing the following interrelated and mutually enhancing virtue-propositions124:
• Solidarity prioritises community by recognising that individuals are naturally
and irrevocably embedded in social contexts; they are in a state of
interrelationship or interconnectedness with individuals, groups, and society.
• Solidarity emphasises equality and active promotion of welfare through its
grounding in compassion, fraternity, and a genuine interest in the wellbeing
of others, the ultimate goal being to construct, through personal and
collective actions, both a just and decent or fair society.
• As a result of our inclusion in societies and the complex of social
relationships and values that is needed to realise standards of decency and
121 A fact discussed by participants in the Banking (On) The Brain Project: BOTB, Ibid.
122 For arguments in support of expanding our ethical frame, see S Harmon, ‘Solidarity: A (New) Ethic for
Global Health Policy’ (2006) 14 Health Care Anal 215–36; T Schrecker, ‘Benefit-Sharing in the New
Genomic Marketplace: Expanding the Ethical Frame of Reference’ in B Knoppers (ed) Populations and
Genetics: Legal and Socio-Ethical Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston 2003) 405–21; M Häyry, ‘European
Values in Bioethics: Why, What and How to be Used?’ (2003) 24 Theor Med 199–214; D Callahan, ‘Prin-
ciplism and Communitarianism’ (2003) 29 J Med E 287–91; S Benatar, ‘Blinkered Bioethics’ (2004) 30 J
Med E 291–2; B Knoppers, ‘Of Genomics and Public Health: Building Public ‘Goods’?’ (2005) 173 Cdn
Med Asstn J 1185–6.
123 We do not wish to be seen as overly critical of autonomy. Autonomy can and does serve the public good
and is not necessarily contrary to public mores or community wellbeing. However, the over-
individualisation of autonomy has the effect of erecting and encouraging the idea of a freestanding individ-
ual independent of the community and with few responsibilities to the community, or responsibilities for
the consequences to the community of his or her individualist choices: W Gaylin and B Jennings, The Per-
version of Autonomy: Coercion and Constraints in a Liberal Society (GUP, Georgetown 2003) at 203.
124 S Harmon, n 122 above.
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justice within societies, solidarity emphasises the virtue of duties over rights;
duties flowing from and towards individuals and communities that may
require collective interests and public goods to take priority over the interest
of individuals or sub-collectives.
So conceptualised, solidarity helps us characterise participation in brain banking as a
beneficial opportunity, if not an obligation, to contribute to individual and public
health beyond one’s lifetime; it characterises participation as a legacy which contrib-
utes to intergenerational justice by enabling the health of future generations, and, as
such, is a means to advance human wellbeing more generally.125 If solidarity is better
integrated into the legislative regime and the decisions that it structures, a new interac-
tion can be framed.126 And this interaction might better close the gap between levels
of claimed support for research and the opportunity to make a contribution, and
actual participation in research.127
In a recent report commissioned by the Nuffield Council, the authors conceive of
solidarity as signifying a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, social, emo-
tional, or otherwise) to assist others that require individual actions and collective com-
mitment.128 The report offers a three-tier approach to how individuals might interact
with solidarity:129
• Tier-1: Interpersonal: At base, solidarity is viewed as an expression of
willingness to carry costs to help others with whom a person recognises
similarity, sameness, or symmetry. It demands actions by individuals to help
other individuals within a group or community who share certain things in
common with them.
• Tier-2: Group Internalisation: This solidarity arises when certain action
elements of solidarity become engrained in a group (ie: come to represent an
aspect of ‘good conduct’), and so evolve into forms of institutionalisation. At
125 For more on intergenerational justice, see, eg, H ten Have, ‘Global Bioethics and Communitarianism’
(2011) 32 Theor Med Bioeth 315–22; B Knoppers and Y Joly, ‘Our Social Genome’ (2007) 25 Trends
Biotechnol 284–8.
126 For more on solidarity, see S Harmon, n 122 above; R Houtepen and R ter Meulen, ‘New Types of Solid-
arity in the European Welfare State’ (2000) 8 Health Care Anal 329–40; R Ashcroft, A Campbell, and S
Jones, ‘Solidarity, Society and the Welfare State in the United Kingdom’ (2000) 8 Health Care Anal 377–
94; R Chadwick and K Berg, ‘Solidarity and Equity: New Ethical Frameworks for Genetic Databases’
(2001) 2 Nat Rev Genet 318–21; S Sternø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (CUP, Cambridge
2004); M Haÿry, ‘Precaution and Solidarity’ (2005) 14 Camb Q Health Eth 199–206; R ter Meulen, W
Arts, and R Muffels (eds), Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe (Kluwer, Dordrecht 2010). For
more on solidarity’s many inclusions in international biolaw, see S Harmon, ‘Ethical Rhetoric: Genomics
and the Moral Content of UNESCO’s “Universal” Declarations’ (2008) 34 J Med E e24.
127 Research shows that family members often derive some comfort from their loved ones’ donation, but that
the strongest support for donation comes from families who have lost a member to a particularly tragic cir-
cumstance such as a sudden accident or death by suicide: see T Millar and others, n 9 above, at 372,
Table 2; J Bell and others, n 5 above, at 505.
128 See B Prainsack and A Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics (Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, London 2011), at 5.3 and 5.4, a characterisation taken up by the authors of the report in subse-
quent publications.
129 Ibid, at 5.7–5.13.
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this level, solidarity can be defined as ‘manifestations of a collective
community to carry costs to assist others who are all linked by means of a
shared situation or cause’,130 and a common example of this is self-help or
patient groups.
• Tier-3: Contractual/Legal: This tier is where the social norms of the previous
tiers solidify into contractual or other legal norms; it is a fixed or enforced
form of solidarity, examples of which include the welfare state, social welfare
arrangements, statutorily protected/enforced trade unionism, etc.
This framework is useful for thinking about where solidarity needs to be introduced
and how it might be embedded to reorient public perceptions about, and the regula-
tory regime applicable to, brain banking, and we shall return to it below. Suffice to say
presently, we believe that shifting both participation levels in biobanks and regulatory
frameworks demands two interrelated movements: first, the public interest must be
understood in a more active sense which not only recognises rights, but also duties
(ie: it must be understood as demanding positive efforts on the part of individuals as
a component of their social citizenship); and, second, the moral or value-foundation
of the public interest (and public goods) must be given a more prominent role, both
generally and in individual conversations (such as that between physician/recruiter
and patient/family). Solidarity offers a valuable touchstone for undertaking or facili-
tating these movements.
B. Operationalising Solidarity in Brain Banking
Conceptualising participation in brain banking as an act of solidarity justified (if not
demanded) by the public interest encourages a shift towards greater consideration of
the public good aspect of the enterprise. So grounded, the implications for brain
banks might be that a system of mandatory donation to brain banks could be justified
on utilitarian, virtue, and international human rights grounds.131 While mandatory
donation might be considered problematic by some, particularly in our prevailing
individualistic social context, additionally so in this context given the deep personal
and growing cultural significance of the brain,132 it is not without its supporters. A
mandatory system has been justified in other contexts on the grounds that individuals
receive public health benefits stemming from brain and other life science research,
and they must therefore be viewed as accepting those benefits on the understanding
that they may need to contribute to the ‘public good’ by donating post mortem tissue
for such research. Indeed, it has been argued that if we accept the benefits of medical
research (eg: antibiotics and other medicines), then we have an obligation to contrib-
ute to social practice which produce those benefits.133 Where that contribution is
130 Ibid, at 5.12.
131 For arguments in favour of a duty to participate in research, see S Harmon, n 122 above; J Harris, ‘Scientific
Research is a Moral Duty’ (2005) 31 J Med E 242–8. The duty might be considered even stronger where,
as here, there is no risk of harm to the individual participant (because he or she is already dead).
132 A point which came up in the BOTB Project: see S Harmon and G Haddow, n 50 above.
133 J Harris, n 131 above, at 243. He goes on to argue that individuals are already required to make contribu-
tions to the public good (eg: through taxation or jury service), and there is no reason why the same justifi-
cation would not ground a contribution to research.
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only made after death, the argument is even stronger,134 although such a system
would need to incorporate provisions permitting individuals to object to donation in
keeping with other human rights (eg: freedom of religion), which would operate in
exceptional circumstances.
Despite the defensibility of mandatory donation, we are not arguing for this, and
the sheer cost and personnel demands would, in any event, make it unsustainable.
Further, it should be acknowledged that brain banks do not require donation from all
individuals; they merely need an increase in current donation rates, particularly of
‘normal’ brains. Thus, we propose a regime which gives preference to public needs, and
which justifies those preferences with reference to the public good that is health, the
public interest in its achievement, and acknowledgement of the ‘social contract’ which
we all enter into. The social contract theory recognises that individuals gain benefits
from society (and this is certainly so in a democratic welfare state with a
free-at-point-of-service healthcare system), and it holds that individuals must therefore
also give back to society.135 As part of that, they must accept that their interests may
sometimes be compromised for the ‘public good’; and what less intrusive time to
compromise those individual interests than after death when the compromise will
mean nothing to the individual who is being asked/commanded to contribute? If we
accept that individuals and society are in a contractual relationship in which each
entity must not only receive but should also give, the question becomes: How can we
better embed the notion that it is a social responsibility to support biobanking? Here
we can draw on the three-tier interaction set out by Prainsack and Buyx.
When individuals decide to participate in a biobank, it is an act of Tier-1 solidarity
insofar as they do so with the acceptance that certain costs will be incurred by them
(or their survivors) for the sake of communal benefit.136 Increased participation will
be facilitated by attitudinal change; people must be encouraged to internalise solidar-
ity and to accept the responsibility to act, for values are most commonly operational-
ised when they are internalised and embraced by publics.137 This can be done
through public campaigns highlighting the prevalence of brain conditions, the pivotal
role of brain banks in the treatment of same, and the benefits of research participa-
tion.138 While some question the propriety and effectiveness of ‘nudge’ policies,139
134 See D Price, Human Tissue in Transplantation and Research: A Model Legal and Ethical Donation Framework
(CUP, Cambridge 2010) 53–63.
135 See J Rawls, ATheory of Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972).
136 B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 128 above, at 6.18.
137 So pointed out by C Casillas, P Enns, and P Wohlfarth, ‘How Public Opinion Constrains the US Supreme
Court’ (2011) 55 Am J Poli Sci 74–8, who claim that in some cases judges may follow public opinion
rather than the letter of the law so as to maintain the legitimacy of law.
138 In the past, such campaigns have been successful, for instance, following a publicity campaign in Australia a
consent rate of 58% was recorded as provided by bereaved families on the day of post mortem for donation
of the whole brain: see L Azizi, T Garrick, and C Harper, ‘Brain Donation for Research: Strong Support in
Australia’ (2006) 13 J Clin Neurosci 449–52. For more on the use of nudge in the health arena, see M
Quigley, ‘Nudging for Health: On Public Policy and Designing Choice Architecture’ (2013) 21 Med LR
588–621.
139 T Goodwin, ‘Why We Should Reject “Nudge”’ (2012) 32 Politics 85–92; Y Saghi, ‘Salving the Concept of
Nudge’ (2013) 39 J Med E 487–93; R Ashcroft, ‘Doing Good by Stealth: Comments on “Salvaging the
Concept of Nudge”’ (2013) 39 J Med E 494; L Bovens, ‘Why Couldn’t I be Nudged to Dislike a Big Mac’
(2013) 39 J Med E 495–6; G Dworkin, ‘Lying and Nudging’ (2013) 39 J Med E 496–7; B Welch, ‘Shifting
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their use of sociology, behavioural economics, and social psychology is a practical way
to rationally structure choice architecture so socially useful outcomes can be
achieved.140 It has already been pointed out that the problem of countervailing
nudges must be overcome if such campaigns are to work.141 Obviously, that counter-
vailing push should not come from regulation. Indeed, we argue that the campaigns
could be statutorily dictated, as has been done in Wales with respect to transplanta-
tion; the Human Transplantation of Organs (Wales) Act 2013 imposes a duty on
Welsh Ministers to promote transplantation and encourage donations deemed neces-
sary for the improvement of the health of the people of Wales.142
Tier-2 solidarity is implicated by how the bank structures its decision-making, how it
shapes its relationship and interactions with the public, and how it communicates.143
The bank must view its donors (and more specifically their surviving family members)
as partners in the research endeavour to whom the bank owes certain duties important
to the maintenance of trust, and it must structure its governance and interactions as
such.144 This also has state implications. First, more optimal and transparent biobank
structures and governance arrangements could be statutorily shaped. Second, a magni-
tude change in donation would demand a firm commitment by the state to provide suffi-
cient financial support to ensure that resources and personnel are available to manage
that increased donation.145 This is particularly important because the agreement to
donate (ie: to bear that cost) must be met with effective measures to make that donation
meaningful. If efforts or resources are wasted, public mistrust could justifiably set in.
An example of how tier-3 might be engaged is when solidarity is used to shape stat-
utory structures so that they are more reflective of public goods and the public inter-
est.146 The law should explicitly adopt solidarity as a guiding value in an effort to
make a positive difference in recruitment practices and participation levels. Solidarity
can be relied on to:
the Concept of Nudge’ (2013) 39 J Med E 497–8; AWertheimer, ‘Should “Nudge” be Salvaged?’ (2013)
39 J Med E 498–9; Y Saghai, ‘The Concept of Nudge and its Moral Significance: A Reply to Ashcroft,
Bovens, Dworkin, Welch and Wertheimer’ (2013) 39 J Med E 499–501.
140 Secretary of State for Health, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our Strategy for Public Health in England
(HMG, London 2010), at 24 and 30. For more on the operation of nudge politics, see R Thaler and C
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decision about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Penguin, London 2008).
141 T Marteau and others, ‘Judging Nudging: Can Nudging Improve Population Health?’ (2011) 342 BMJ
263–5.
142 See s 2, HTOWA 2013.
143 B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 128 above, at 6.33.
144 And for more on possibilities in this regard, see S Harmon, n 3 above; B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 93 above.
145 Kretzschmar, n 34 above, at 26, states that the cost per brain collected is estimated at E10,000–E15,000
for BrainNet Europe. For a discussion of resource implications of organ transplantation, see S McLean,
Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge, London 2010), at 207; B Teo, ‘Is the Adoption of More Effi-
cient Strategies of Organ Procurement the Answer to Persistent Organ Shortage in Transplantation?’
(1992) 9 Bioethics 113–29.
146 Prainsack and Buyx offer the circumstance of data-sharing practices being imposed as contractual obliga-
tions for access to the resource as another example of tier-3 solidarity in action: see B Prainsack and A
Buyx, n 128, at 6.34.
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• more stoutly vindicate the wishes of a deceased to donate in the face of
resistance by survivors (ie: the use of solidarity to better operationalise
autonomy); and
• more openly override the deceased’s (or survivors’) decision to not donate in
limited circumstances (such as when the individual has a rare disease that has
become the target of research, or where brain banks make a specific call for
‘normal’ brains).
In furtherance of this, we suggest that ‘authorisation’ is the most appropriate deci-
sional mechanism, and that, to work optimally, that mechanism must stipulate dis-
courses which encourage all parties to consciously consider the public good of health,
the public interest in (brain) banking, and the fundamental value of ‘solidarity’ in the
exercise of their autonomy. In other words, it must inject some non-risk-based deci-
sional criteria into the interaction in recognition of the fact that the individual risks of
participating in biobanks are minimal (and not commensurate with participating in
more tradition trial-based research).147
Additionally, parties must be assigned authority commensurate with their interest
in the cadaver. Obviously, the first interest holder is the deceased insofar as she wishes
to donate and has made that wish known. This conscious choice, made when the
deceased was a living, rights-bearing individual with autonomy interests, benefits the
many and so, despite the above-noted evaporation of interests upon death, should, in
the round, be respected. Not only does this respect reflect the value we—the public
—placed on the individual when she was alive, it might also be characterised (cau-
tiously) as a ‘memorial right’, meaning a right that was held and exercised in life that
should be (and can only be) vindicated after death. As such, it is important to
acknowledge that it is the (deceased) individual’s right, not the family’s right, and it
should be seen as vesting upon death with the public, thereby enhancing the possibil-
ity of vindication.148
In all other situations, the interest ranking must run from public, down to family,
down to deceased. This acknowledges how decisional autonomy in relation to the
corpse falls away upon the individual’s death, and that the most interested remaining
party is the public. Others—who have no strong principled interest in the corpse
other than beliefs grounded in religion, superstition, or revulsion—should not hold a
veto unless their objection is based on reliable evidence that the deceased objected to
donation. Again, a provision similar to that in the Human Transplantation of Organs
(Wales) Act 2013 relating to families would be useful.149 This position is supported
by Harris, who argues that, if we are to presume anything of the deceased, we should
presume that he or she would have wished to donate; it is right to assume that the
147 For a brief discussion of the risks, see B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 93 above.
148 Again, and importantly, we are not proposing a framework for mandatory donation, but rather a conceptual
change to the framework founded on solidarity. Under such a framework, active individual contribution
and attitudinal change surrounding donation and medical research generally are encouraged, and such is
supported by the above.
149 See s 4.4(4) HTOWA 2013, and discussion of this at n 14 above.
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deceased had no interest in frustrating knowledge or increasing the probability of
others’ death.150
In addition to altering how donation is broached and supported, a solidarity
approach would have implications for consent documents (and re-consent for new
uses of the samples). Rather than over-emphasise risks, the consent process and its
documentation would make greater efforts to highlight the benefits of donation and
to inform parties about how the bank has structured its governance, oversight, and
access policies so as to maximise utility and transparency, and to minimise and then
appropriately manage risks. It would demand admitting to potential donors that
neither recruiters nor bank custodians can know all possible uses or research direc-
tions, and that the donor would be agreeing to participate in a context of uncer-
tainty.151 It would emphasise the values and goals of the bank to which the donor
would be contributing, and the Agreement to Participate could:152
• acknowledge that the donor has considered the possible advantages and
disadvantages of participation, including worst-case scenarios;
• articulate that the surviving representative would be entitled to continue a
dialogue with the bank on an ongoing basis; and
• stipulate that the bank can use the tissue for research purposes into the
future, including for unforeseen or changing research aims so long as they
comply with the clearly stated values or mission of the bank.
This approach, which shares some characteristics with previously discussed ‘consent
as a propositional attitude’ and ‘participation as a public interest’ approaches,153 vindi-
cates autonomy within a solidarity framework that grants banks the flexibility needed
to remain viable and effective over time.
VI . CONCLUSION
Neurological diseases are on the rise worldwide, and so research aimed at understand-
ing and alleviating them will play an increasingly critical role in human health and
wellbeing, and on the capacity of public healthcare systems to cope with demands.
Brain banks are essential to that undertaking. However, for brain banks to deliver on
their promises, there must be a shift in how we think about brain banking. The
consent model under the HTA 2004 has a number of shortcomings, most notably the
tension provoked by the individualistic nature of consent, which fails to offer any
space for consideration of the community-enhancing aims of brain banking. While the
150 J Harris, n 58 above, 540.
151 See B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 128 above, at 6.14 and 6.23. In such a case, as noted by Prainsack and Buyx,
the initial disclosure must offer individuals information as to both the broad aims/aspirations of the brain
bank and the known research questions currently pursued, its funding and governance structures, its
process for dealing with personal information, its commercialisation strategy (if any), and a statement that
the brain bank may be used for purposes which have not yet been envisaged but for which ethics approval
would have to be obtained.
152 For more on a solidarity-based approach to recruitment for biobanks and what such an approach might
demand, see S Harmon, n 3 above, and B Prainsack and A Buyx, n 93 above.
153 See S Harmon, Ibid, for the latter, and O O’Neill, n 85 above, for the former.
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authorisation model under the HTSA 2006 is arguably even more autonomy-centred,
it might be viewed as an improvement.154 However, its reliance on the same narrow
value foundation as the HTA 2004 means that it also fails to express the values most
advantageous to banking and to truly reify the difference that authorisation was
supposed to achieve.
The statutory frameworks would benefit (and so would the biobanking enterprise
and society) from a greater emphasis on solidarity as a guiding value. Discussions
which include explicit references to solidarity (in addition to autonomy and risk)
remind us that we are part of a broader community, and that individuals have (and
should fulfil) obligations towards that community. Incorporating solidarity into our
legislative frameworks and recruitment practices would better respect the wishes of
the deceased (in cases where those wishes are now being overridden by family
members), and would better realise the public interest and public goods that are at
play. In this regard, it behoves us to make every effort to maximise the public invest-
ment that has been made in these resources, and to advance the public interest that
brain banks underwrite.
A solidarity-grounded regime might offer solutions to some of the recurrent chal-
lenges or practical questions faced by brain banks. Having reference to the questions
posed in the Introduction, we might argue as follows.
Who should consent in the absence of the expressed wishes of the deceased?
Drawing on an assumption that people wish to contribute positively to society and to
facilitate scientific knowledge as a public good (and indeed the public good), and that
they are (or should be) supportive of ethical research and donation thereto (and this
assumption is reinforced by their acceptance of the fruits of medical research), the
Coroner or Procurator Fiscal should consent to donation for research when they have
care of a cadaver, and they should be able to trump most objections raised by the
family in other situations. In short, solidarity supports public authorities having
greater power to prevail if there is a variance of views as to what should be done with
the deceased’s brain when the deceased has been silent as to donation.
If the known wishes of the deceased conflict with those of the family, who prevails?
If there are conflicting views as between the deceased (wishing to donate) and surviving
family members (wishing to preserve the corpse intact), there should again be a pre-
sumption in favour of donation which is in the ‘public good’; indeed, this does nothing
more than vindicate the autonomous choice of the deceased, an outcome which the
deceased would have expected (and presumably did expect when s/he was alive).
If re-consent is needed for new research, who should provide this, especially if the
deceased gave the original consent? The original provision of information should
address this scenario squarely, and the Agreement to Participate should be drafted
such that re-consent or re-authorisation is not required when new avenues of
154 And the McCracken Report recommends that the Department of Health should review the HTA 2004 and
consult on amendments to bring it more into line with the Scottish legislation, and that the HTA should
pursue closer cooperation with other regulators to eliminate overlaps or inconsistencies in regulatory
activities and ensure understood and seamless regulatory pathways: see Recommendations 15 and 16 of
J McCracken, Review of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority and the Human Tissue Authority
(2013), at 10, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
216947/Justin_McCracken_report_of_review_of_HFEA_and_HTA.pdf> accessed 15 September 2013.
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investigation emerge post-donation; it should ensure that the agreement to donate
means donating to the brain bank, with all that that entails, not to a specific research
target. The bank’s governance structure, in turn, should be such as to ensure transpar-
ency of decision-making, clarity around and ease of access, and availability of informa-
tion to the public (ie: it should have an accessible communications element).155
Obviously, a key component of the legal and decisional framework would be trans-
parency. This is not a strong feature in existing regimes because neither the decisional
hierarchies nor the factors which go into arriving at decisions are clear. Improved
transparency would encourage solidarity and make clearer to people how biobanks
aim to realise reciprocity, another important driving value in this field. By embedding
solidarity in the legal framework for brain donation and shifting the focus from the
risks of donation (which are limited in the cadaveric context) to the opportunity pre-
sented for individuals to contribute to the health and legacy of future generations, a
more sustained commitment to, and realisation of, the public good will be possible,
and could be actively encouraged.156
155 In this respect, we note Recommendation 4 of the McCracken Report, Ibid, which encourages the HFEA
and HTA to review and strengthen their arrangements for consulting with stakeholders on their approach
to regulatory activities, and to ensure that issues raised with them and their responses are publicly available
and discussed regularly in open meetings.
156 The precise operational aspects of this framework are the subject of further investigation. Should such a
framework be adopted, it would need continuous development and re-evaluation to ensure practice aligns
with public perceptions and public interests as and if the stages of solidarity become embedded.
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